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Abstract 
 
 
 
 Contrarian Investment Strategy is an investment philosophy that has been gaining more 
followers in the last 30 years. With this academic paper, we intend to apply an investment strategy 
based on this philosophy in the Portuguese market for recent data (2001-2016) relying in the 
methodology of De Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) and Soares and Serra (2005). Furthermore, 
it is our goal to study the impact that credit ratings have in the contrarian profitability. We 
observed contrarian effect only in the pre-crisis period (2001-2006) and for the samples 
containing all firms and for the one containing only unrated firms – in fact rated stocks have a 
negative impact in the overall sample. We also concluded that our results are in accordance with 
the literature, in the sense that extreme portfolios have stocks rated in similar credit rating classes 
and also that have a low number of rated stocks.   
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Abstrato 
 
 
 Estratégia de Investimento Contrarian é uma filosofia que tem vindo a ganhar um 
conjunto cada vez mais alargado de seguidores ao longo dos últimos 30 anos. Com este trabalho 
académico, pretendemos aplicar uma estratégia de investimento baseada nesta filosofia  no 
mercado português para dados mais recentes (2001-2016), baseando-nos nas metodologias de 
De Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) e Soares and Serra (2005). Adicionalmente, temos como 
objetivo estudar o impacto que os ratings de crédito das empresas têm na rentabilidade desta 
estratégia. Apenas observámos efeito contrarian no período antecedente à crise (2001-2006) e 
somente para a amostra que contém todas as empresas e para a mostra que contém empresas 
sem ratings – aliás, empresas com ratings tiveram um impacto negativo no efeito contrarian. 
Também concluímos que os nossos resultados estão em concordância com a literatura, pois 
observámos que os portfolios loser e winner continham empresas com classes de rating similares 
e também continham poucas empresas com ratings.    
 
 
 
Palavras-chave: Estratégia Contrarian; Ratings; Portfolios de Investimento; Sob reação.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 A contrarian investor is the one who does not follow the stereotyped investment strategy 
to bet in the good stocks. In other words, the investor buys the assets that are viewed as bad 
ones because of bad news released about them or as a result of poorly past performance. This 
way of investing presupposes the investment in companies in which the majority of the investors 
had already given up. This form of investing has been gaining more followers in the last three 
decades, since the evidence of positive results got more support. Examples of this are the works 
of Keeffe and Gallagher (2017), Soares and Serra (2005), Forner and Marhuenda (2003). 
 Studies about this investment philosophy are more accentuated in the US market, the 
main and most important works are from De Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1987). However, they 
have been implemented in other countries around the world, such in the U.K. with Gregory, 
Harris, and Michou (2001) and Germany in the paper by Schiereck, De Bondt, and Weber (1999). 
 In the case of Portugal, the studies are scarce, however Soares and Serra (2005) and 
Pereira (2009) studied it with positive conclusions regarding this effect in the Portuguese stock 
market. These studies are performed for an earlier pre-crisis period. Hence, it is our intention to 
make the study in a more recent period, from 2001 until 2016.  
 There are some variables that impact this strategy’s profitability. The main ones studied 
are the January effect and the size effect. The first is the evidence that a loser portfolio earns 
higher returns in January and the second one refers to the evidence that loser portfolios 
containing smaller stocks (in terms of market cap) than the winners tend to earn higher returns. 
Nevertheless, there is one other variable, less studied, which has impact in the profitability of 
this strategy, which is credit ratings. 
 Credit ratings influence the investor’s decisions when choosing when and in what to 
invest. Therefore, it is expected that a contrarian strategy would be impacted due to credit rating 
since these can be an indicator for the investor to choose the stocks to invest.  
 The main study is the one of Avramov, Chordia, Jostova, and Philipov (2007) for US 
market, where they compared the returns of the momentum strategy with the stocks’ credit 
rating. They found statistically significance in the impact of ratings in momentum.  
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 For contrarian strategies, there is the work of Sasaki and Miyazaki (2012) in Japan. They 
also showed evidences of the impact of ratings. 
 Hence, and since there is no studies regarding the credit ratings and contrarian strategies 
for the Portuguese market, this dissertation has two main pillars of study. First, study the 
contrarian profitability for a more recent period (2001 – 2016), and to test the impact of credit 
ratings in loser and winner portfolios of a contrarian investment. This aims to fill the gap in the 
literature and also to complete it with more recent data. 
 Therefore, to measure these two effects, we based our methodology in the works of De 
Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) and Soares and Serra (2005) for the study of the contrarian 
profitability, which in fact is the main methodology used in the literature, and in the work of 
Avramov et al. (2007) to test the impact of credit ratings.  
 This dissertation is structured as follow: section 2 we present the literature review, in 
section 3 we display the data used and the detailed description of the methodologies applied. In 
section 4 we expose our findings and in section 5 the conclusions and final remarks.  
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2. Literature Review 
 
As a contrarian investor, one buys stocks that have been performing poorly in the last 
years and sells the ones that have been performing well. This philosophy assumes the investment 
on value stocks, that are characterized by low price-to-book ratio, low P/E ratio and high 
dividend yield. Also, these stocks are associated with companies inserted in distressed 
economies, with low growth potential. In more simplified words one buys loser stocks and sells 
winner stocks. 
In this way, the investor would profit due to the evidence of price reversal1. Evidence 
suggests that this price reversals happen in the long term, Fama and French (1988) found that 
the returns of a strategy of five year period presents a serial correlation more negative than the 
returns of one year period strategy. 
 The first explanation of this price reversal, lies in psychological bias, for instance the one 
proposed by Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (1982), in which they state that investors tend to 
overreact to unexpected and dramatic news, or in other words, when the investors revise their 
projections they tend to overweight recent information and underweight past information.   
This can also be interpreted as a violation of the Efficient Market Hypothesis (hereafter 
EMH) – stocks are traded at their fair value and market prices are the best estimation of their 
value, incorporating all the available information at any given time. Since prices reflect all 
information, any attempt of beaten the market would be just a game of odds. Thus, the 
contrarian strategy can be seen as a disruption of this hypothesis since there is evidence that 
loser outperform winner portfolios, and such pattern is not tolerable under the EMH. 
Complementing this, Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) and based on the 
work of De Bondt and Thaler (1985), found that price reversion may be due to “biased self-
attribution” investors and “overconfidence”, meaning that those who become wealth thanks to 
successful investments tend to become overconfident, therefore, they see themselves as more 
able to value stocks, than what they really are. This finding is not exclusively for the financial 
area; it has been shown that people, in general, tend to overestimate their own abilities. 
                                                 
1 Price reversal is associated with a negative serial correlation in returns, i.e., positive returns are more likely to 
follow negative returns and vice-versa. 
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The second explanation is that reversion is a result of the combination of “conservatism 
bias” – this phenomenon is referred to investors that update their views insufficiently when they 
are confronted with new public information – and “representative heuristic bias” – where 
investors tend to look for patterns even though the events are stochastic – proposed by Barberis, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) corroborating with Kahneman et al. (1982). 
 One of the most important works developed about the contrarian strategies, is the one 
made by De Bondt and Thaler (1985), for the US market. They created two portfolios, one with 
35 stocks performing badly in the last years, and other with 35 stocks performing well, and 
examined the returns obtained for the next sixty months after the creation of the portfolios. 
They found that losers outperformed winners by about 25% in the cumulative abnormal returns, 
confirming the price reversion theory. In fact, the loser portfolio outperformed the market by 
approximately 20%. De Bondt and Thaler used both observation and holding period of 3 years 
and 5 years, concluding that the 3-year strategy performed better than the 5-year strategy. The 
authors called this as Overreaction Effect.  
 De Bondt and Thaler also reached the same conclusion of Kahneman et al. (1982), in 
which stocks that went through more (less) extreme return experiences in the observation 
period, the subsequent price reversals will be more (less) pronounced. In other words, large price 
movements in one direction it will be followed by large price movements in the opposite 
direction. 
 Thus, an important implication of this is that reversals may be predicted from past 
information, which contradicts, as mentioned above, the EMH.  
 Therefore, these authors also confirmed the psychological factors suggested by 
Kahneman et al. (1982), because in their study they found changes in returns’ directions and this 
can also be interpreted as an evidence of investors’ irrational behaviour.  
   
2.1. Evidence around the world 
 
 The majority of studies on the contrarian strategies are performed in the US market, 
such as the works of De Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) and Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny 
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(1994), that used a sample of stocks listed on NYSE and AMEX,  both studies showing positive 
results when applying this strategy. 
 However, in the last thirty years, the value investing has been performing a key role in 
the investment strategies, gaining more followers. Thus, in order to enlarge the veracity of profits 
in this strategy, not only for the US market, more studies have been executed in other countries.  
 In the UK market, Gregory et al. (2001), using data from January 1975 to December 
1998, found that value stocks beat significantly the glamour stocks, using a holding period of 5 
years. They used four indicators to classify stocks into value and glamour (book-to-market value 
of equity, earnings yield, cash flow yield and average sales growth over the previous three years), 
and for all the four measures the value stocks outperformed the glamour stocks.  
 In Brazil, Da Costa (1994), using stocks listed in São Paulo Stock Exchange, applying 
the same methodology of De Bondt and Thaler (1985), they found the overreaction effect within 
the period 1970-1989. In fact, the difference in returns of the loser and the winner portfolio is 
25.69% (t-stat = 2.92) with a holding period of 12 months. For a holding period of 24 months, 
the authors concluded that the loser outperformed the market by 17.63% (t-stat = 2.62), while 
the winner underperformed by 20.25% (t-stat = – 2.98). 
However, an interesting fact arises comparatively to the US and UK market. The reversal 
happens after 2 years of portfolio creation, which is a shorter term than the evidence for those 
two markets. This effect was also found in other countries: Mun, Vasconcellos, and Kish (1999) 
concluded that for France and Germany, the 1-year contrarian portfolios tend to earn higher 
returns than the 2-year, and this one than the 3-year. More recently, Doan, Alexeev, and Brooks 
(2016) in the Australian stock market, found that contrarian strategies perform better in the short 
term, in this case for holding periods of 12 weeks or less.  
 Schiereck et al. (1999), tested the profitability of the contrarian strategy using German 
companies listed in the Frankfurt Stock Exchange for the period of 1961 to 1991, using winner 
and loser portfolios composed by 20 stocks each, and found an excess return of 21.70% (t-stat 
= 1.32) for a holding period of 5 years. An interesting fact noticed in this study was the inverse 
relation between the number of stocks in the portfolio and the excess returns. When the authors 
increased the number of stocks from 20 to 40 the excess return decreased to 16.66%, and when 
they reduced to 10 stocks the returns augmented to 26.84%.  
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 However, these studies are performed for big economies, mainly for USA, but also for 
German market and UK market. Henceforth, Antoniou, Galariotis, and Spyrou (2005) 
mentioned a noteworthy fact, they stated that this strategy would be more profitable in small 
economies, since these markets “(…) are characterised by more predictability, thin trading and are 
dominated by small and less sophisticated investors that do not instantaneously respond to information.” 
Antoniou et al. (2005, p. 72). Therefore, these authors, using weekly data for all the stocks listed 
in the Athens Stock Exchange, applied the strategy of short the previous week’s winner and goes 
long on the previous week’s losers, and found positive and economically significant excess 
returns for the period January 1990 – August 2000. 
 More recently, Keeffe and Gallagher (2017), conducted an interesting study and also one 
of the most recent studies in this field, for the period from 1989 to 2015, using as well stocks 
listed in the Athens Stock Exchange. In here they included two distinct economic periods: before 
crisis and during the crisis. Most studies are performed considering a sample from a tranquil 
period or predominately bull markets, thus there are no recent studies that show how a 
contrarian strategy would behave in a period of crisis. Therefore, this authors split the sample in 
two, 1989-2006 (pre-crisis) and 2007-2015 (crisis), and in each they ranked the stocks based on 
the previous 6 to 36 months, creating two portfolios (winner and loser) and holding them for 6 
to 36 months. To estimate the abnormal returns the authors used three models – CAPM, Market 
Model and Adjusted Market Model – and since all produced similar results, we will refer to the 
results from the Adjusted Market Model.  Using the methodology of De Bondt and Thaler (1985) 
for the pre-crisis, crisis, and all the sample, the authors found positive excess abnormal returns 
for the pre-crisis period and for the entire sample, 48.3% (t-stat = 2.43) and 17.5% (t-stat = 0.64) 
respectively. However, this is not verified when performed for the crisis period, that fails to 
show positive abnormal returns, -43.2% (t-stat = -1.13).  
  Soares and Serra (2005) used a sample period between 1988 to 2003 (16 years), using 
monthly data for stocks traded on the Portuguese Stock Exchange – a total of 82 stocks. They 
applied the same methodology used in the works of De Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1987), creating 
two periods, the observation one and the test/holding one. For each stock in the observation 
period they calculate its cumulative abnormal return (CAR) and ranked the stocks on the CAR 
basis. Then, these are sorted in quintiles, creating a top 20% best performance and a bottom 
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20% worst performance, thus, the winner and the loser portfolio, respectively. They found 
supportive evidence for the overreaction hypothesis 24 months after portfolio creation, i.e., the 
loser portfolio outperformed the winner portfolio, in fact the average abnormal return of the 
loser portfolio is 8.62% (t-stat = 0.40) versus -5.64% (t-stat = -0.35) of the winner portfolio. The 
authors performed this strategy for different holding periods (6, 12, 18 and 24 months) however 
they concluded that a strategy up to 24 months would yield positive abnormal returns, however 
not statistically significant.  
 Moreover, Pereira (2009), using stocks listed on Euronext Lisbon from January 1994 to 
December 2008, found the same results as Soares and Serra (2005). 
 Alonso and Rubio (1990) and Forner and Marhuenda (2003) performed the study of 
Contrarian Strategies in the Spanish stock market, being the seconds a complement of the study 
made by Alonso and Rubio.  
 Alonso and Rubio (1990) tested for the period of 1967 – 1984, creating a winner and a 
loser portfolio composed by five stocks each. The results obtained were positive and statistically 
significant for a time horizon of three years, in which the difference in the average cumulative 
excess returns between loser and winner was 36.9% (t-stat = 1.47). They repeated the experiment 
increasing the number of stocks from five to ten and concluded that the difference between the 
losers and the winners was softened. Another important evidence found was the direct relation 
between time horizon and the power of overreaction, i.e., the longer the observation and holding 
periods the stronger is the overreaction. 
 Forner and Marhuenda (2003) in order to complement and further investigate the study 
mentioned above, they enlarged the period in analyse (January 1963 – December 1997), using 
the methodology of De Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1987), they created portfolios of five stocks 
each analysing 6, 12 and 60 month strategies in addition to the 3-year strategy already made. The 
results obtained were slightly different, they found a fall in the significance of the contrarian 
profitability, although this does not happen when it is considered a time horizon of five years, 
which has positive and significant results.  
 Concerning the Italian market, there is a lack of studies regarding the contrarian studies 
that focus this market by itself. The Italian market has been included in international studies that 
analyse a pool of different countries in the same sample, which is the case of Baytas and Cakici 
 8 
(1999) that studied the performance of long-term contrarian strategy for different countries, 
such as Japan, France, UK, Germany, Italy and Canada. In their work, the authors found that 
for the Italian market this strategy had an average return of 21.6% (t-stat = 0.053). 
  However, the most important study is the work made by Mengoli (2004). Despite he 
focused his work solely in the Italian market, the author does not focus only in the contrarian 
strategies but also in momentum strategies. He used a sample of all the securities listed in the 
Milano Indice di Borsa (MIB), from January 1950 to June 1995. He used the methodology of 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), called the J-K methodology. They denominated the winner and 
loser portfolios sorting the stocks on the past performance basis on the past J-months (J = 3, 6, 
12) using quintiles, and tested the performance of the portfolios in the following K-months (K 
= 3, 6, 12, 36). The authors concluded that the losers had higher returns the bigger the 
observation period, and the returns of the winners decreased. However, the authors found that 
the reversion effect is not stronger.  
 Therefore, although there are few studies of contrarian strategies in countries with feeble 
economic structures, such as Italy, Portugal, Spain and Greece, the ones that exist show positive 
results. 
 
2.2. January Effect, Size Effect and Asymmetric Profits 
 
 Despite the confirmation of the contrarian profits worldwide, there are some caveats 
that several authors use as a justification of these profits.   
 These caveats overemphasize the returns obtained from the loser portfolio, which are 
important to bear in mind when dealing with the overreaction effect, such as the so-called 
January effect and Size effect. The first effect is referred to the evidence that the loser portfolios 
earn higher returns in January than in other month of the year. There are some reasons pointed 
to the evidence of this effect. One is that there is a tax-loss selling by investors, in the sense that 
investors sell the stocks in December that have been performing poorly, and then they buy back 
the same stocks in January (Sias & Starks, 1997). Other explanation has to do with the fact that 
investors may earn some bonuses in the end of the year and invest them in the beginning of the 
next year, causing the abnormal returns (Ritter, 1988). 
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 In order to complete their previous studies and also to test the caveats referred above, 
De Bondt and Thaler (1987) confirmed the existence of January effect (and also the size effect) 
since it is in this month that the loser portfolio earned all its excess returns. Yao (2012), using 
portfolios composed with stocks listed in NYSE and AMEX, found that the contrarian strategy 
in the long term is entirely due to the January Effect.  Barone (1990)  also showed that the mean 
rate of change in the MIB (Milano Indice di Borsa) in January was approximately 33% for the period 
of January 1975 to August 1989, presenting a strong influence of the referred effect.  
 Despite the findings of these authors concerning the January Effect, some studies found 
that this effect is not significant in other countries. Mun et al. (1999) found no significance in 
January returns for Germany and France, which is a confirmation of the previous work of Huu 
Minh (1995) to the French stock market. This last author stated that there was a strong positive 
evidence just in the first two days of negotiation of the year and not for the whole month. Soares 
and Serra (2005) corroborated this showing that actually the loser portfolio earned less than the 
winner portfolio in January, in the Portuguese stock market. In the case of China, Chen, Hua, 
and Jiang (2015) found no evidence of January seasonality as well, concluding that the differences 
in the performance of both portfolios are not very different between January and the other 
months.  
 The second caveat is referred to the evidence that when the stocks of the loser portfolio 
are smaller (in terms of market cap) than the ones of the winner portfolio, the loser portfolio 
tend to outperform the winner portfolio. There is more evidence that size effect enlarges the 
profits of contrarian strategies. As a matter of fact, Zarowin (1990) claimed that the overreaction 
effect is purely a manifestation of the size effect.  
 The main reason for this phenomenon is due the fact that the transaction costs of the 
small stocks are higher comparatively with the large stocks, and since these are riskier stocks, in 
the sense that there is less information available, consequently their premium will be higher.  
 Ising, Schiereck, Simpson, and Thomas (2006) and Schmidt (2017) in their studies for 
the German stock market found evidence of size effect, observing an average market 
capitalization outstandingly smaller in the loser portfolios when comparing with the winner. 
Regarding the Australian market, Doan et al. (2016), show that the smallest stocks predominate 
in the loser portfolio. The same results are obtainable for the Greece Stock market (Antoniou et 
al. (2005)), and Soares and Serra (2005) state that for the case of Portugal the median stock 
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presented in the winner portfolio is almost 5 times the market cap of the median stock presented 
in the loser portfolio.  
 Although this effect is presented in a variety of studies, Chopra, Lakonishok, and Ritter 
(1992) stated that the overreaction effect is presented even when portfolios are adjusted for size. 
 Another interesting pattern found in the literature is that there is evidence that the 
contrarian profits are asymmetric. This arises from the overreaction hypothesis – large price 
movements in one direction will be followed by a large price movement in the opposite direction. 
In fact, there is evidence that when the initial movement is strong the next opposite movement 
will also be prominent. 
 De Bondt and Thaler (1987) found this evidence and concluded that the return of the 
loser portfolio was approximately three times more than the return of the winner, in the US 
market.  Forner and Marhuenda (2003) also found asymmetric returns in the Spain stock market; 
Baytas and Cakici (1999) concluded that this effect is strongly pronounced in some cases, for 
instance, in Japan the price reversal is more accentuated for the winners than for the losers, while 
the winner earned about 69% less than the market, the loser earned approximately 26%. 
However, these authors found that this effect is soften in countries such as U.K., Germany and 
France.  
 However, Da Costa (1994) concluded that the Brazilian market is symmetric, which is in 
contrast with the results of De Bondt and Thaler (1985). Soares and Serra (2005), in the case of 
Portugal, found that the asymmetric effect is weak. 
 
2.3. Credit Rating as an explanatory factor of Momentum and 
Contrarian Effect 
 
In the last section, we exposed some of the most studied variables that have been point 
out as explanatory variables of contrarian profits – January effect and size effect. However, there 
is one variable few studies concern in studying, but we believe it is important when investing in 
the markets: credit rating. It is known that this indicator influences market agents during their 
investment decisions, for instance, institutional investors categorize rating grades as investment 
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grade and non-investment grade, and hence it can be considered as a screen in the capital 
allocation.  
Studies have been showing that credit risk follows the tendency of the business cycles, 
and it reflects the economic environment.  Moreover, there is evidence that either momentum 
and contrarian profits behave accordingly with the different phases of the economy. For instance 
Keeffe and Gallagher (2017) concluded that for the period of crisis the returns of the contrarian 
strategy were statistically insignificant, and Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) for the momentum 
effect in the US market, both studies reaching the conclusion that economic expansions and 
recessions affect the profits of both anomalies. Therefore, following both premises, we can ask 
whether credit rating affects the profitability of these effects.  
The literature concerning this subject is scarce. The most important study is the one 
performed by Avramov et al. (2007) regarding only the momentum effect. First, using the 
methodology of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), for the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ, using 
monthly data, the authors constructed the loser and winner portfolios, ranking the stocks 
accordingly its abnormal returns in the observation period of six months. This technic was 
executed for three sample sets: rated firms, unrated firms and all firms, in order to analyse the 
momentum profitability in the different categories. The authors reached some interesting 
conclusions. The extreme loser portfolio (P1) had an average rating of BB-, while the extreme 
winner (P10) had an average rating of BB+. Therefore, it is in the extreme portfolios that are 
presented the lowest and the next-lowest credit rating, respectively. However, the middle 
portfolios, such as P6 for instance, contains firms with a high investment grade, an average of 
BBB+. Therefore, there is evidence that credit rating forms a U-shape across momentum 
portfolios, meaning that this strategy (buy winners, sell losers) consists in taking long and short 
positions in firms with high credit risk (low rating grades). Also, this shows that momentum 
profitability is restricted to firms with high credit risk. 
Another interesting aspect that the authors pointed out was that while the momentum 
profitability does not always arise from the small stocks (size effect mentioned in the previous 
section), it arises among the high credit risk stocks. 
And finally, the authors found that within the extreme portfolios there are more unrated 
firms than rated, and among the rated ones in these portfolios there are more firms with a 
noninvestment grade rating. 
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Concerning the contrarian effect, and similarly to the momentum, there is a lack of 
studies. The authors that tested the relationship between contrarian profits and credit rating were 
Sasaki and Miyazaki (2012) for the Japanese equity market. They implemented a contrarian 
strategy for the period of June 1998 to May 2008 using monthly data. In order to test the impact 
of the credit rating in the profits of this strategy, the authors divided the sample in three groups 
accordingly with its rating score (AAA/AA, A and BBB/BB group), and for each the stocks 
were sorted in portfolios based on its past performance. The main conclusion of this study is 
that the better the credit rating group the higher the contrarian return, i.e., the contrarian returns 
on AAA/AA and A groups are larger than that on the BBB/BB group. However, the statistically 
significance appears only in the groups with high credit rating. The loser portfolio earned an 
average monthly return of 1.56% and 0.52% on AAA/AA and BBB/BB group, respectively, 
and the winner portfolio earned an average monthly return of -0.05% and 0.88%. 
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3. Data and Methodology 
 
 In this section, we will present the data used in this study and the methodology applied 
to build the portfolios within the contrarian strategy in the Portuguese market as well as the 
procedure to test the impact of credit ratings in this investment strategy. 
 
3.1. Data 
 
 The data used was collected from Thomson Reuters DataStream. It is composed by 
monthly stock prices for all the stocks traded in Lisbon Stock Exchange, from January 2001 to 
December 2016 summing a total of 192 months.  
 In order to avoid the survivorship bias we considered all the stocks that have been traded 
throughout all the sample period including the ones that had been delisted during this period. 
Thus, there are 97 stocks traded, which are dispersed along the period of analysis, starting with 
74, whereas in the end of the period there are 60 stocks, reaching a maximum of 83 stocks.  
 Thereby, for a given stock to be included in the investor’s portfolio, it must have traded 
continuously during all the observation period and at least one time in the holding period. This 
criteria was based on the work of De Bondt and Thaler (1985). 
 We collected, as well from the DataStream, the companies’ ratings for the same period 
of analysis. Based on the work of Avramov et al. (2007), it was collected the Standard & Poor’s 
Long-Term Domestic Issuer Credit Rating, summing a total of 12 rated firms. 
 In addition to this data it was also collected the industry sectors of each company, as 
shown in Table 3-1, to better understand if the results obtained happen across the sectors or in 
some specific one. This is an important variable since the Portuguese market is small, and the 
listed companies are concentrated in some specific sectors. 
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Table 3-1 - Sectors 
 
 
3.2. Methodology 
 
The methodology used was the one based on De Bondt and Thaler (1985), which was 
also used for the Portuguese stock market in the work of Soares and Serra (2005). This 
methodology is applied for different sub-periods within all the sample, which are split in two – 
observation period and holding period. Stocks are ranked accordingly with its past performance 
in the observation period and they will be holding in the subsequent period. The strategy used 
was a 24 month/24 month, i.e., observation period and holding period of 24 months each. 
Starting the sample in 2001 and ending in 2016 and implementing the referred strategy, there is 
7 non-overlapping observation/holding sub-periods. Therefore, for the observation periods of 
2001-2002, 2003-2004, and so forth until 2013-2014, there will be the holding periods of 2003-
2004, 2005-2006, and so forth until 2015-2016, respectively.  
For each of the 7 non-overlapping periods we calculated the cumulative market-adjusted 
log returns (CAR) in the observation period for each stock. Despite there are other methods to 
estimate the abnormal returns, for instance the CAPM model, we chose the Adjusted Market 
Model used on the work of Soares and Serra (2005) and also because Keeffe and Gallagher 
(2017) concluded that both models produced similar results, as mentioned in the previous 
section.  
Sectors Number of Firms 
Number of Rated 
Firms 
Consumer Goods 12 - 
Banking and Investment Services 18 7 
Computing and Electronic 7 - 
Travel & Leisure 12 - 
Industry, Manufacturing and 
Construction 
32 2 
Pharmaceutical and Chemicals 3 - 
Electricity 3 2 
Telecommunications 10 1 
TOTAL 97 12 
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Thus, to calculate the CAR it was used the following formula: 
 
Equation 3-1 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = ∑(𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚,𝑡)
𝑡
𝑡−24
 
 
where 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the market return on each month t, calculated as an equally weighted average 
return of all the stocks presented in the sample, and 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the log return for the stock i on 
month t, calculated as follows: 
 
Equation 3-2 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = log(𝑃𝑖,𝑡) − log(𝑃𝑖,0) 
 
 After these calculations, each stock will be sorted accordingly its CAR in each 
observation period, and ranked into quintiles. Therefore, there will be a top and a bottom 
portfolio, defined as the 20% best performing stocks and the 20% worst performing stocks, 
respectively. Thus, the top portfolio will be called from now on as Winner Portfolio (or P5) and 
the bottom as Loser Portfolio (or P1).  
 Now that the stocks are sorted and ranked in the observation period, it is necessary to 
evaluate the behaviour of the portfolios. Therefore, we calculated the average Cumulative 
Abnormal Return in the holding period as follows: 
 
Equation 3-3 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑝,𝑧 = ∑[
1
𝑁
∑(𝑅𝑖,𝑧,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚,𝑧,𝑡)
𝑁
𝑖=1
]
24
𝑡
 
 
 Since we are considering all firms that traded in the analysed period even those that were 
delisted or dead, this procedure involves a rebalancing in the portfolios each month. Using an 
equally weighted strategy, when a stock is no longer available in one month the average 
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cumulative return is rebalanced considering only the stocks available.  Thus, p denotes the 
portfolio, z is the holding period and N refers to the number of stocks available in each month. 
 The next step is calculating the Average Cumulative Abnormal Return for each portfolio 
for all the seven holding periods as:  
 
Equation 3-4 
𝐴𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑝 =
∑ 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑝,𝑧
7
𝑧=1
7
 
 
 As mentioned in the literature, the evidence of price reversal is associated to a negative 
serial correlation in returns. This is verified from Equation 3-4 when the loser portfolio earns 
positive average returns and the winner portfolio earns negative average returns. In other words, 
when the 𝐴𝐶𝐴𝑅𝐿 > 0 and 𝐴𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑊 < 0. 
 In order to access the statistical significance of the ACAR of each portfolio it is 
calculated the t-statistic as follows: 
 
Equation 3-5 
𝑡𝑝 =
𝐴𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑝
𝑆𝑝
√7
⁄
 
where 𝑆𝑝 is the sample standard deviation of the loser and winner portfolios, computed as:  
 
Equation 3-6 
𝑆𝑝
2 =
[∑ (𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑊,𝑧 − 𝐴𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑊)
27
𝑧=1 + ∑ (𝐶𝐴𝑅𝐿,𝑧 − 𝐴𝐶𝐴𝑅𝐿)
27
𝑧=1 ]
2(7 − 1)
 
 
 The profitability of the contrarian strategy is verified by subtracting the profits of the 
winner to the profits of the loser, i.e., 𝐴𝐶𝐴𝑅𝐿 − 𝐴𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑊, since this strategy involves taking a 
long position in the loser portfolio and a short position in the winner. Thus, to calculate the 
statistical significance we used the following t-statistic: 
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Equation 3-7 
𝑡𝐿−𝑊,𝑧 =
(𝐴𝐶𝐴𝑅𝐿,𝑧 − 𝐴𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑊,𝑧)
√2𝑆
2
7⁄
 
 
 This method is applied three times for different sub-samples: the first includes all the 
firms, the second only includes the rated firms and the last one contains solely the unrated firms. 
This is implemented in order to test the impact of ratings in the profitability of the contrarian 
strategy and it is based on the work of Avramov et al. (2007). 
 Concerning the ratings, they were converted in a numerical scale, thus an AAA rating 
corresponds to number 1 and a D rating corresponds to number 22.2 Therefore, when a portfolio 
presents a high (low) numerical score it means that it contains more firms with a lower (high) 
credit rating – higher (lower) credit risk, using an equally weighted average. Regarding all the 
rated companies, the equally weighted average rating is 7.04 which reflects an A- grade. For a 
more detailed information regarding the amounts of firms in each credit rating consult Graph 
7-1 and Table 7-1 on the Appendix.  
  
                                                 
2 The complete scale is: AAA = 1, AA+ = 2, AA = 3, AA− = 4, A + = 5, A = 6, A− = 7, BBB+ = 8, BBB = 9, 
BBB− = 10, BB+ = 11, BB = 12, BB− = 13, B+ = 14, B = 15, B− = 16, CCC+ = 17, CCC = 18, CCC− = 19, 
CC = 20, C = 21, and D = 22 
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4. Evidence 
 
 In this section, we will present the results obtained from the applied methodology, and 
discuss the conclusions withdrawn from the evidences observed. First, this chapter will focus on 
the application of the methodology mentioned above in order to check the presence of 
contrarian profitability. After that it will be performed the right procedures to analyse the impact 
of ratings in this strategy. Reported in Table 4-1 there is the Average Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns concerning the period in analysis for the three samples.  
 
Table 4-1 - Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (2001-2016) 
This table represents the ACAR from the Loser (P1), Winner (P5) portfolio and also for the difference between both portfolios. 
The stocks were ranked in the 20% best and worst performance based on their past performance in the last 24 months, and a 
stock to be included in the portfolio it must be traded all the months in the observation period and at least one time in the 
holding period. Afterwards, the stocks were held in the following 24 months and the portfolio is monthly rebalanced when a 
stock is delisted or dead. Below each ACAR and in parenthesis are presented the t-statistics  
 
 All Firms Rated Firms Unrated Firms 
Number of Firms 97 12 85 
Loser (P1) -0.83% -1.49% -0.33% 
 (-0.181) (-0.282) (-0.081) 
Winner (P5) 2.16% -1.19% 1.58% 
 (0.706) (-0.346) (0.546) 
L-W -2.99% -0.30% -1.90% 
 (-0.580) (-0.051) (-0.410) 
 
 The first observation withdrawn from the above table is the inexistence of the reversion 
effect, i.e., no evidence of contrarian effect, since for all the three samples it is verified that the 
Loser portfolio had negative ACAR and the Winner had the opposite. In fact, any of the values 
presented in the above table have statistical significance. Despite this conclusion, it is verified 
that the difference between both portfolios is less negative among the rated sample, however it 
is not possible to conclude anything concerning the impact of ratings in the contrarian strategy 
because this does not occur in the period analysed.  
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 Therefore, the next step of this study is to find a way to understand in a smaller range of 
time whether there are or not price reversion. Thus, based on the work of Keeffe and Gallagher 
(2017) that found different results when applying the contrarian strategy before and after crisis, 
the samples were divided accordingly with their study: pre-crisis and crisis.  Hence, from 2001 
until 2006 is considered the pre-crisis and from 2007 until 2014 is considered the crisis period, 
regarding the observation periods. 
 
Table 4-2 – Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Pre-Crisis and Crisis Periods 
This table represents the ACAR from the Loser (P1), Winner (P5) portfolio and also for the difference between both portfolios, 
for all the three types of samples in the two periods – pre-crisis and crisis. The calculations for these portfolios were the same 
as the previous table. Below each ACAR in parenthesis are presented the t-statistics where * denotes statistical significance at 
10% level. 
 
All Firms Rated Firms Unrated Firms 
  Pre-Crisis Crisis Pre-Crisis Crisis Pre-Crisis Crisis 
Loser (P1) 1.99% -2.94% 0.52% -2.99% 2.32% -2.31% 
 (0.297) (-0.371) (0.198) (-0.270) (0.299) (-0.404) 
Winner (P5) -2.68% 5.79% 1.78% -3.42% -2.71% 4.79% 
 (-0.555) (1.517)* (0.720) (-0.504) (-0.604) (1.245) 
L-W 4.67% -8.73% -1.26% 0.43% 5.03% -7.10% 
  (0.666) (-1.039) (-0.421) (0.038) (0.662) (-1.070) 
 
 Table 4-2 shows the results obtained. Analysing in a first moment the pre-crisis period, 
it is showed that when considered all firms there is evidence of price reversion, since the average 
cumulative abnormal return of the loser is positive (1.99%) and negative for the winner portfolio 
(-2.68%). Also, the contrarian effect is found in the Unrated Firms sample, in fact with a higher 
𝐴𝐶𝐴𝑅𝐿−𝑊 than the one considering all firms (5.03% against 4.67% respectively). However, this 
effect it is not observable in the sample containing only the rated firms. 
 The first conclusion withdrawn from these evidences is that when splitting the sample 
containing all firms in rated and unrated, it is observable that the returns have an increase in the 
unrated firms sample comparing with all firms (5.03% against 5.67%, respectively) than the rated 
firms’ sample which in fact had a negative return of -1.26%. Therefore, this means that rated 
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firms have a negative impact in the contrarian strategy when considering the all firms’ sample 
whereas the unrated firms have a positive impact.  
 Regarding the crisis period, it is not observable the contrarian effect in any of the three 
samples. Despite the 𝐴𝐶𝐴𝑅𝐿−𝑊 is positive for the rated firms sample, which could be a sign of 
this effect, when considering in detail the two portfolios it is perceptible that both got a negative 
return and this is a violation of the premise of contrarian investment, i.e., the losers 
outperforming the winners.  
Henceforward the study of the impact of ratings will be performed for the three samples 
and for all the periods just for control purposes, however the conclusions will be only concerning 
the pre-crisis period, since it is only in this one that the contrarian effect is present. 
Thus, to study the impact of credit ratings in the performance of contrarian strategies, 
first for the entire sample of firms, for each observation period and for each portfolio (P1 and 
P5) we checked whether there were rated companies or not. After that and using the scale 
mentioned in the previous section, the ratings within each portfolio were converted in a scale 
number in order to access easily the average credit score. The results obtained are presented in 
the table below: 
 
Table 4-3 - Credit Ratings of the Loser and Winner Portfolios 
In this table are represented the average credit rating for all the firms sample and for the sample containing only rated firms. 
The study was performed for all the three periods but only the one in bold has evidence of contrarian effect, this means that 
only this one has interest in the study. The first line represents the average credit score for each portfolio and the line below 
corresponds to the respective credit rating.   
 
  All Firms Rated Firms 
  All Period Pre-Crisis Crisis All Period Pre-Crisis Crisis 
Loser 
(P1) 
11.43 3.33 17.50 13.57 12.67 14.25 
BB+ AA CCC B+ BB- B+ 
Winner 
(P5) 
3.86 5.67 2.50 14.57 11.33 17.00 
AA- A AA B BB+ CCC+ 
 
 According to the above table, it is noticeable that the average credit rating has no pattern 
in the different periods within each portfolio. In a superficial analysis, for all firms’ sample there 
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are more evidence of firms rated in an A category than in the rated firms’ sample where there 
are more firms rated in a B category. 
 Considering now the period where the contrarian strategy is present, this is the pre-crisis 
in the all firms’ sample, the results are in accordance with the literature, since the extreme 
portfolios – loser and winner – have a similar credit rating class, AA and A respectively.  
 Another point of the literature that we found in our study is the evidence that loser and 
winner portfolios do not contain a great amount of rated firms. This evidence is presented in 
Table 4-4. In Panel A we show the number of rated firms within each extreme portfolio in all 
the holding periods in comparison with the total amount of stocks. Hence, it is visible that for 
all the periods we see a low volume of rated firms for both portfolios. In Panel B we show the 
average percentage of rated firms in each portfolio for the three sub-periods, which also 
confirms the evidence of low volume of rated firms in the extreme portfolios.  
 
Table 4-4 - Amount of rated firms in each portfolio 
PANEL A: 
In this first table, it is showed the number of rated stocks presented in each holding period for the loser and the 
winner portfolio relatively with the total stocks contained in each. 
 
 
PANEL B: 
In this table, it is represented the average percentage of rated firms in each portfolio, for the three periods in consideration for 
this study. In bold is the period where there is evidence of contrarian profitability. 
 
 All Period Pre-Crisis Crisis 
Loser (P1) 10% 4% 15% 
Winner (P5) 4% 7% 2% 
 
 
  I II III IV V VI VII 
P1 
Number of rated firms 2 0 0 2 0 2 4 
Total Stocks 16 16 14 14 14 13 13 
P5 
Number of rated firms 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 
Total Stocks 16 15 14 11 14 9 13 
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 Another interesting investigation is to observe the industry sectors of the listed 
companies, in order to see whether this is somehow related with contrarian profitability. 
Portuguese market has a low number of listed companies, and the majority are concentrated in 
one economic sector “Industry, Manufacturing and Construction”, as seen in Table 3-1. Despite 
this sector represents the main slice of the listed companies, it is not the one that has the most 
rated firms. 
 Table 4-5 concentrates the number of rated firms per industry sector for all the three 
periods in analysis, divided in All Firms and Rated Firms for the extreme portfolios.    
 
Table 4-5 - Number of rated firms per sector 
 This table represents the amount of rated firms in each extreme portfolio for the three periods in analysis per industry sector. 
In bold is emphasized the period where there is evidence of price reversion.  
  
   
Banking and 
Investment 
Services 
Industry, 
Manufacturing and 
Construction 
Electricity Telecommunications 
A
ll
 F
ir
m
s*
 
P1 
All Period 6 1 1 1 
Pre-Crisis 1 - 1 - 
Post-Crisis 5 1 - 1 
P5 
All Period 2 1 - 1 
Pre-Crisis 2 1 - - 
Post-Crisis - - - 1 
R
at
ed
 F
ir
m
s P1 
All Period 5 - 1 1 
Pre-Crisis 3 - 1 1 
Post-Crisis 5 - - - 
P5 
All Period 4 2 1 1 
Pre-Crisis 3 1 1 - 
Post-Crisis 2 1 1 1 
* See Graph 7-2 in Appendix 
  
 
 The main concentration of rated firms is in the Banking and Investment Services 
industry, for all the periods. However, when focusing only in the period where effectively we 
had contrarian profitability (pre-crisis – all firms), albeit we see that in fact this is the most 
populated industry with rating firms, the amount is not high (1 firm in the loser portfolio and 2 
in the winner). This is in accordance in the previous evidence that extreme portfolios are not the 
ones populated with a high amount of rated firms.  
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5. Conclusions 
 
 Our work aimed to test the profitability of a contrarian strategy applied in a recent sample 
(2001-2016) for the Portuguese market, and also to analyse the influence of the stocks’ credit 
rating in the outcome of this strategy. Basing our work in previous ones, such as Soares and 
Serra (2005) and Avramov et al. (2007), we reached some interesting conclusions.  
 The first main conclusion is that when considering the full period there is no evidence 
of contrarian profits for the three samples (all firms, rated firms and unrated firms).  
 Based in previous studies, we split our sample in two observation periods: pre-crisis 
(2001-2006) and crisis (2007-2014). We reached the conclusion that is only in the pre-crisis that 
the contrarian strategy is profitable. However, this does not happen for all the samples. When 
considering a sample containing only rated firms, we see that there is no profitability, unlike the 
sample containing all firms and the one containing only unrated, the first with an ACAR of 
4.67% and the second with 5.03%. Looking at these values, it is perceptible that credit rating 
had a negative impact in the overall sample, i.e., when considering, for the same period, a sample 
with all firms and other with unrated firms, we see an increase in the profitability of the 
contrarian strategy in the unrated.  
 Focusing only in the pre-crisis period for the sample with all firms, we see that our results 
are in accordance in the literature. First, both loser and winner portfolios have similar credit 
rating classes (in our study, AA and A respectively). And second, extreme portfolios do not have 
a great amount of rated stocks. We see low volumes of rated firms for all the observation periods 
in both portfolios – only 4% (7%) are rated firms in the loser (winner). 
 Our last conclusions focus on the industry sectors of the Portuguese companies. We see 
that despite the majority of the listed companies are in the “Industry, Manufacturing and 
Construction” sector, the rated ones do not belong to this sector but belong to “Banking and 
Investment Services Industry”. However, when focusing in the pre-crisis period for the sample 
containing all firms, we see that both loser and winner portfolios do not have a high amount of 
these stocks, in fact we see that only one rated stock of this sector in the loser and two rated 
stocks of this sector in the winner. This can also be interpreted as an effect of the previous 
evidence that extreme portfolios do not have a great amount of rated stocks.  
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 Despite our conclusions are in accordance with the literature, we are facing a small 
sample since the Portuguese market has not a great amount of listed companies. Furthermore, 
within the listed ones, there are only 12 that have credit ratings.  
 In future studies, it would be interesting to build all the 5 portfolios and not only the 
loser and the winner, in order to have a full picture of the behaviour of a contrarian strategy 
through all portfolios.  
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7. Appendix 
 
Graph 7-1 - Number of firms in each credit rating 
This graph represents the number of firms rated in each credit rating through all the sample period. This means that this graph 
does not take in consideration companies that had an upgrade or a downgrade.  
 
 
Table 7-1 - Number of firms in each credit rating by Observation Period 
 
This graph represents the amount of firms rated in each credit rating according the observation period. 
 
 2001-2002 2003-2004 2005-2006 2007-2008 2009-2010 2011-2012 2013-2014 
AAA - - - - - - - 
AA+ - - - - - - - 
AA 2 1 1 1 1 1 - 
AA- 1 1 - 1 1 - - 
A+ 2 1 2 - 1 - - 
A 2 2 1 3 3 1 - 
A- 3 5 5 3 2 5 1 
BBB+ 1 1 1 - - 1 - 
BBB - - - 1 2 1 1 
BBB- - - - 1 1 2 - 
BB+ - - - - - - 3 
BB - - - - - - 2 
BB- - - - - - - 2 
B+ - - - - - - 1 
B - - - - - - - 
B- - - - - - - - 
CCC+ - - - - - - - 
CCC - - - - - - - 
CCC- - - - - - - - 
CC - - - - - - - 
C - - - - - - - 
D - - - - - - - 
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Graph 7-2 - Rated firms per portfolio and sector 
This graph shows the amount of rated companies per sector and portfolio for the three periods in analysis. This represents only 
the sample including all firms. 
 
 
 
